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UNCRASHWORTHY AIRCRAFT
AND THE
MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
E VER SINCE man entered the field of aviation, airplanes have crashed.
The ratio of aircraft which have fallen from the sky to the total number
in use has dropped greatly since man's first attempts at flight. But aircraft
crashes are still very much a reality. During the period 1967-1976, ap-
proximately 97,211 individuals were involved in 46,576 general aviation
(civil non-commercial aircraft) accidents.' This is an average of 4,657
accidents per year.' Six hundred seventy-six accidents proved fatal.' It has
been estimated that "at least 70 percent of the aircraft in production today
will eventually have an accident."'
In a major pioneering study completed in 1952, A. H. Hasbrook found
that of 913 light plane accidents involving 1,596 occupants and resulting
in 389 fatalities, 143 people died in structural environments that remained
intact or were merely distorted.' Hasbrook concluded that these 143 peo-
ple, or roughly one-third of the total number killed in light plane accidents
died unnecessarily, for they died in what are generally considered to be
survivable crashes.' Recent studies of general aviation accidents have shown
no substantial improvements in occupant protection.' Accidents similar
to those in the Hasbrook study have resulted in the litigation of the issue
of crashworthiness.
Crashworthiness from an engineering point of view is "the relative
ability of a particular vehicle design to withstand crash forces with minimal
structural damage."' In law the term refers to the ability of the vehicle
to protect the passengers from exacerbated injuries following a collision.'
These "enhanced injuries"'" occur when a secondary impact (secondary
to the vehicle colliding initially) occurs between the injured party and
1R. SNYDER, GENERAL AVIATION CRASH SURVIVABILITY (Society of Automotive Engineers,
Inc. Technical Paper Series No. 780017 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SNYDER].
2Id. at 3.
a d.
4 J. BRUCE & J. DRAPER, CRASH SAFETY IN GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT, Report of the Nader
Student Group, Center for Responsive Law (Jan. 1970).
5A. Hasbrook, Severity of Injury in Light Plane Accidents: A Study of Injury Rate, Air-
craft Damage, Accident Severity, Impact Angle, and Impact Speed Involving 1596 Persons
in 913 Light Plane Accidents, Av. Cir. 55-105 (Sept. 1959).
O ld. at 22, 79.
7 SNYDER, supra note 1, at 12.
a Id. at 2.
9 Haase, Automobile Crashworthiness: Evans Takes A Backseat, 21 VILL. L. REv. 72, 73
(1975-76).
10Foland, Enhanced Injury: Problems of Proof in "Second Collision" and "Crashworthy"
Cases, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 600 (1977).
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a specific part of the interior or exterior of the vehicle, or when the in-
juries are enhanced or increased over what they would have been had
the vehicle been designed differently.
The courts have imposed upon the manufacturer a duty to use rea-
sonable care in the design and manufacture of a product, to minimize in-
juries to its users, and not to subject its users to unreasonable risk of injury
in the event of a collision or an impact." The court in Dyson v. General
Motors Corp." defined an automobile manufacturer's responsibility when
it said, "It is the obligation of an automobile dealer to provide more than
merely a movable platform capable of transporting passengers from one point
to another. The passengers must be provided a reasonable safe container with
which to make the journey."' 3 One must note that this is not a duty to
design a vehicle to withstand all collisions under any circumstances.' "The
manufacturer does not have to make a product which is 'accident-proof' or
'fool-proof. Liability is imposed only when an unreasonable danger is
created." 5
The concept of crashworthiness has now been accepted by a resound-
ing majority of states if not all states." Although widely used since Larsen7
in automobile crash cases, 8 crashworthiness has only recently been suc-
cessfully applied to the aircraft. Perhaps this foreshadows the future. The
automobile differs only slightly from the helicopter and the airplane. All
are products; all are accepted modes of transportation; and all may
be designed to be reasonably safe. The doctrine of crashworthiness has been
so widely accepted with respect to the automobile that the time has now
arrived for the doctrine to be accepted in the field of aviation. Generally
in the past, the same standards for product liability applied to other prod-
ucts have also applied to aircraft.' 9 Thus it is no surprise that crashworthiness
issues are beginning to surface in cases of aircraft accident litigation.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
During the past fifteen years, the law has abruptly turned in its ac-
ceptance of the doctrine of crashworthiness. In 1966 the Seventh Circuit,
upheld the dismissal of a suit based on the doctrine of crashworthiness (as
it is now known) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
11 Id.
12 Dyson v. General Motors Corp. 298 F. Supp. 1064 (8th Cir. 1968).
13 Id. at 1073.
14 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
is ld. at 502.
18 N. Cousins, The Second Impact Principles of Crashworthiness, 11 TRIAL LAW. Q. 21
(1976).
17 298 F. Supp. at 1073.
Is Foland, supra note 10, at 600.
19 2 S. SPEIsER & C. KRAUSE, AVATION TORT LAW, 475 (1979).
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granted. Evans v. General Motors Corp."0 has been considered by many to
be the leading case denying recovery under the crashworthiness concept.2
In Evans, a 1961 Chevrolet station wagon was designed with an "X" frame
instead of a perimeter frame as used by other automobile manufacturers.
The automobile was involved in an accident and Roy Evans died as a
result of injuries received. The representative of the estate alleged negligent
design of the vehicle, claiming that the perimeter frame provided much
more protection for occupants of the car and that by omitting side frame
rails, defendant created an unreasonable risk of harm. Plaintiff charged
negligence, breach of implied warranty, and strict tort liability. The court
questioned the duty which an automobile manufacturer owes to users of its
product. The court noted that the plaintiff did not assert that defendant's
design could have functioned to avoid the collision; neither did plaintiff
assert that the "X" frame caused the collision; nor did plaintiff contend
that the decedent would not have been killed had a perimeter frame been
used. The court then cited Campo v. Scofield" for the proposition that "a
manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile accident-proof
or fool-proof."'" The court recognized that the defendant had a duty to
insure that the automobile was reasonably fit for its intended purpose, but
that "[t]he intended purpose of an automobile does not include its par-
ticipation in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability
to foresee the possibility that such collision may occur.'"24
But now the tide has shifted. In 1968 Larsen v. General Motors Corp.2"
surfaced. Larsen involved a 1963 Chevrolet Corvair in a head-on collision.
The impact caused a severe rearward thrust of the steering mechanism into
the plaintiff's head resulting in serious injury. The rearward displacement
of the steering shaft on the left frontal impact was greater than that on
other cars, which were designed to protect against such rearward displace-
ment. The plaintiff alleged negligent design, negligent failure to warn of the
alleged defect, and breach of express and implied warranties of merchant-
ability. Defendant General Motors contended that it had no duty to produce
a vehicle in which it was safe to collide or one that was accident proof.
General Motors, relying on the Evans rationale, stated that a head-on col-
lision was not the intended use of the vehicle and thus that there was no
liability regardless of the manufacturer's ability to foresee occurrence of
such collisions. The court, however, felt that this was too narrow a con-
struction. In holding for the plaintiff, it stated: "while automobiles are
not made for the purpose of colliding with each other, a frequent and in-
20 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
21 Foland, supra note 10, at 600.
22 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1960).
2 359 F.2d at 824.
"4 359 F.2d at 825.
2 391 F.2d at 495.
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evitable contingency of normal automobile use will result in collisions
and injury producing impacts,"2 and that "[t]he intended use of an auto-
motive product contemplates its travel on crowded and high speed roads
and highways that subject it to the foreseeable hazards of collisions and
impacts."27 The court then went on to speak of the duty owed the user
saying:
This duty of reasonable care in design rests on common law negligence
that a manufacturer of an article should use reasonable care in the
design and manufacture of his product to eliminate any unreason-
able risk of foreseeable injury . . . . while all risks cannot be elimi-
nated nor can a crash-proof vehicle be designed under the present
state of the art, there are many common sense factors in design, which
are or should be well known to the manufacturer that will minimize
or lessen the injurious effects of a collision. 8
It should be noted that Larsen was decided on the concept of negligence.
Many courts were soon to follow the concepts set forth in Larsen.9
In fact, many not only accepted it but expanded the concept to allow ac-
tions in warranty,"° and in strict liability" as well.
Cases which utilize a strict liability theory mainly find this liability in
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402-A."2 Section 402-A states: "One
who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer...." This places on
the plaintiff the dual burden of proving defective condition and the un-
reasonably dangerous nature of the defect. But some jurisdictions have
recently attempted to lessen plaintiff's burden. The California Supreme
Court in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Corp."2 decided that requiring an injured
plaintiff to prove not only a defect in the product, but also that the defect
was unreasonably dangerous, was a much greater burden than was intended
by the court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Co.3" The effect of this
decision is that plaintiffs are now only required to prove that the product
contained a defect and that this defect caused the injury. The California
20 Id. at 502.
27 Id. at 504.
2 8 Id. at 503.
29 Foland, supra note 10, at 600.
80 Friend v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734 (1968).
31 Dyson v. General Motors Corp., F. Supp. 1064 (E.D.Pa. 1969); Brandenburger v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1978); and General Motors Corp.
v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1978).
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1964).
83 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
34 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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Supreme Court later reaffirmed this position in Barker v. Lull Engineering
Co., Inc."3
At present nearly all jurisdictions place some duty upon the manu-
facturer to design a crashworthy vehicle.36 Even the U.S. Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit, which decided the Evans case, has since changed its posi-
tion. In Huff v. White Motor Company"1 the court recognized the principle
of strict liability for the defective design of a fuel system that caused a
truck to ignite upon impact. The court thus placed upon the manufacturer
a duty to design the product to be "[r]easonably fit for its intended use and
to be reasonably free from hidden defects which would render it unsafe
for that use." 8 A crash is now determined to be within the intended use.
Passwaters v. General Motors Corp. 9 in 1972 extended the duty owed
by the manufacturer to the innocent bystander who might foreseeably be
injured by the vehicle. Susan Passwaters was a passenger on a Honda motor-
cycle being operated on a public highway. The motorcycle collided with
a 1964 Buick Skylark which had wheelcovers with unshielded metal flanges
protruding outward. Plaintiff claimed that during the accident these flanges
came in contact with her leg and caused mangling lacerations. The court
concluded that:
[A]lthough the specific injury and the manner in which it occurred may
have been difficult to foresee, nevertheless the unshielded operation
of propeller-like blades on the four wheels of an automobile created
a high risk of foreseeable harm to the general public. The use of high-
ways by pedestrians, the frequency of travel by unprotected persons
riding on bicycles, motorbikes and motorcycles is a common occur-
rence. We think it now settled that a manufacturer does have the
responsibility to avoid design in automobiles which can be reasonably
foreseen as initially causing or aggravating serious injury to users of
the highway when a collision occurs."0
The court in Driesenstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G."' tried to put the
reins on the "foreseeability" concept as extended in Passwaters so that it
would not be overbroadly applied. Driesenstok involved a Volkswagen
microbus that crashed head-on into a telephone pole. The court warned that
"foreseeability" was not to be equated with duty. The key phrase was
"unreasonable risk" of injury.
The question of causation is one frequently raised in second collision
35 20 Cal. 3d 413 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
86 Cousins, supra note 16.
37565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
88 Id. at 110.
89 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972).
40 Id. at 1275.
4 1489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
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crashworthiness cases." A defendant manufacturer quite often attempts
to escape liability by claiming that the defect was not the cause in fact of
the accident, and that, therefore, he should not be held liable. This argu-
ment has been rejected time and again, as in Larsen, for the policy reason
that totally absolving the manufacturer from liability would produce un-
just results. Instead, the courts direct their attention to the reasonable risk
of injury and whether the defect in the product caused the injury. Even
where the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver, the manu-
facturer may still be held liable for the design defects which caused the
enhanced injuries."
This brings one to the logical point of asking, "for what portion of
the damages is the manufacturer liable?" Larsen treated this issue directly
by stating that:
[A]ny design defect not causing the accident would not subject the
manufacturer to the liability for the entire damage, but the manu-
facturer should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury
caused by the defective design over and above the damage or in-
jury that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or
collision absent defective design."
Huddell v. Levine" also spoke to this issue stating that "[I]f the theoretical
underpinnings for liability in this case are to be given effect, [the negli-
gent driver causing the accident] may be held liable for all injuries, but
[the manufacturer] may only be held liable for 'enhanced injuries.'""
III. THE CONCEPT OF CRASHWORTHINESS
IN THE FIELD OF AVIATION LITIGATION
While the doctrine of crashworthiness has been well accepted in auto-
mobile accident litigation in the past ten years, it is only now beginning to
be utilized successfully in the area of aviation litigation. Report on the
actual use of such doctrine in the field of aviation is hindered by several
factors. It is not known in how many aviation cases the crashworthiness
doctrine has been made a part of the allegations. Many of these cases are
settled, as are many of all cases before they get to trial. There is also the
problem that trial court decisions are not as readily available as are most
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court decisions. And since few aircraft
crashworthiness issues have been appealed to date, there are few written
opinions in existence. These factors and others create problems in reporting
on the use of such doctrine in aviation at this time. But nonetheless some
information can be found.
42 Foland, supra note 10, at 612.
43 Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1976).
" 391 F.2d at 503.
45 537 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1976).
4' Id. at 738.
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In 1974 a United States District Court in Mississippi reluctantly refused
to apply the doctrine of crashworthiness to a case involving an aircraft
alleged to be negligently designed and defectively constructed. "7 In Williams
v. Cessna Aircraft Co., the engine of a Cessna 188 burst into flames, and
the plane crashed. On impact, the pilot's seat collapsed and the restraining
safety harness separated allowing the pilot to be thrown violently into the
instrument panel and killed. Plaintiffs did not allege that the decedent
would have survived the crash except for this failure. Rather, they alleged
that this contributed to his death. The District Court, recognizing that
Mississippi had followed the logic of Evans in the cases of Walton v. Chrys-
ler Motor Corp.,"8 Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson" and General Motors Cor-
poration v. Howard,"0 rejected the validity of the concept of crashworthiness
and "second collision" in the state of Mississippi. The court stated that,
"Sitting as a Mississippi trial forum, our task, however, is not to criticize
or ignore precedent, but to follow it where the facts warrant."' In Mississippi,
the doctrine of crashworthiness is recognized for no vehicle. Mississippi
is one of a small minority of jurisdictions which have changed the stance
on crashworthiness. Possibly, if the concept were applied in the near future
to an automobile, its application to aircraft would follow.
In Bruce v. Martin Marietta Corp.5 2 the Tenth Circuit approached ac-
ceptance of the concept of crashworthiness. This case involved a plane
which had been manufactured and sold to Eastern Airlines in 1952. Having
changed ownership several times, it was owned by Ozark Airlines at the
time of the accident. On October 2, 1970, the plane had been chart-
ered to carry the Wichita State University football team and a group
of their supporters to a football game in Logan, Utah. The plane crashed
into a mountain west of Silver Plume, Colorado. The plane first struck
several trees and then traveled 425 feet before coming to a complete
halt. During this accident, the seats in the passenger cabin broke loose
from the floor and were thrown forward against the plane's bulkhead,
blocking the exit. Fire then erupted. Thirty-two of the forty passengers
on board died as a result of the fire. Plaintiffs brought actions against
several defendants including Martin-Marietta, the manufacturer. Plaintiffs
claimed that defendants failed to design, manufacture and/or maintain
the plane in a sufficiently crashworthy fashion. In particular, plaintiffs claimed
that the seats and seat fastenings were not manufactured to withstand a
crash, and that the aircraft was not designed to minimize the possibility
of post-crash fire. Defendants offered evidence that when manufactured,
47Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss. 1964).
48229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
49233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970).
50244 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1971).
8 376 F. Supp. at 607.
62544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976).
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the plane's design was within the state of the art. Plaintiffs claimed that
state of the art is not material when a claim is based on strict liability.
They claimed that showing a design defect in 1970 (barring any sub-
sequent alterations to the plane) established that the plane was defective
in 1952. The court recognized the fact that there was authority in some
jurisdictions for the proposition that state of the art is not relevant in
cases involving strict liability.5" However, this court chose to reject that
approach. Instead the court said that to establish strict liability under sec-
tion 402-A of the Restatement of Torts (Second), the plaintiff must show
that the product was dangerous beyond the expectation of the ordinary
consumer. The court claimed that the state of the art at the time of manu-
facture aids in determining the expectation of the ordinary consumer. The
court then went on to say, "Plaintiffs have not shown that the ordinary con-
sumer would expect a plane made in 1952 to have the safety features of
one in 1970."1"
In analyzing the Bruce decision and in particular this last statement,
one obtains the distinct impression that the court would have accepted
the doctrine of crashworthiness in the field of aviation but felt that the
evidence in this particular case was insufficient to prove plaintiff's case.
Possibly if the plaintiffs had proven that the ordinary consumer had ex-
pected greater safety features of the plane manufactured in 1952, the result
would have been different. Even though the plaintiffs lost this particular
case, it is a stepping stone toward the acceptance of the doctrine of crash-
worthiness in the field of aviation litigation.
The year of 1977 saw more aviation cases involving the issue of
crashworthiness. In Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc.,5 plaintiff was in-
jured when the rented plane which he was piloting ran out of fuel and
crash landed in a field. Plaintiff relied on the second impact theory claiming
that the aircraft was defective because it lacked a shoulder harness and
other crashworthiness features, such as recession of instrument panel knobs,
breakaway instrument panel, and energy absorption device at the front
end of the plane, and proper seat attachment. The court stated that his
reliance on New York's second impact theory was of no avail because
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, thus barring recovery. It is unfor-
tunate for the plaintiff that the court chose to apply New York law. There
had been a question as to which jurisdiction's laws to apply. Many juris-
dictions find that contributory negligence is no defense in strict liability
cases. Since plaintiff's action was barred due to contributory negligence, the
court never reached a decision on the crashworthiness issue. The court
may have found for the plaintiff if not for contributory negligence since
New York does recognize the "second impact" theory.
53 Id. at 447.
54 Id.
55 58 App. Div. 2d 336, 396 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1977).
[Vol. 13:3
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In Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.6 four people were involved in
the crash of a Piper Cherokee. Three of the four died. Plaintiffs, repre-
sentatives of the decedents, claimed, among other allegations, that the air-
craft was not equipped with crashworthy shoulder harnesses or with crash-
worthy seat belt brackets and attachments. The court looked to the in-
sufficiency of the evidence in rejecting the crashworthiness issue. So here
again, but for the insufficiency of the evidence, the aircraft crashworthiness
issue might have been resolved favorably for the plaintiff.
Not all aviation cases involving crashworthiness have disfavored the
plaintiff. During the past few years there have been some astounding suc-
cesses. The very first success known to this author occurred in 1972 in
Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co.5 In this case James Smith, David French
and their two sons were on board a Cessna 210 single-engine aircraft
which was attempting takeoff from a private airstrip in Dallas County,
Texas. Approximately one-half of the distance down the runway a door
that had been tightly secured popped open. The pilot aborted takeoff,
cut the throttle and applied the brakes. The plane failed to come to a com-
plete halt by the end of the runway and rolled down a slight slope, hitting
a barbed wire fence. The plane had never left the ground. At this point
there was only slight damages to the plane and no injury to the passen-
gers. Shortly thereafter fire erupted in the cabin area, burning the fathers.
Both men were forced to evacuate the plane before their sons could be
freed. Attempts to re-enter the plane failed and both sons burned to death.
James Smith lived for a period of five days and then succumbed to his
burns. David French, the lone survivor, was left with serious and permanent
injuries.
At the trial plaintiffs, David French and Joyce Smith (wife and repre-
sentative of James Smith's estate), brought actions in negligence, warranty,
and strict liability. Many of these allegations involved uncrashworthy feat-
ures.5
" 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1977).
67 No. 70-9255-L (193d Jud. Dist. Ct. Dallas County, Tex. Oct. 1972).
58 In particular, plaintiffs claimed that:
a). CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY failed to use fuel line fittings and connections
between the tanks and fuel lines which would not spill fuel in the event of an
impact such as occurred herein.
b). The Defendant CESSNA routed fuel lines within and adjacent to primary impact
and anticipated displacement areas of the aircraft in such a way that the fuel lines
were in danger of being severed or ruptured in the event of an impact such as
occurred herein.
c). The Defendant CESSNA employed the use of rigid rather than flexible fuel
line throughout the aircraft.
d). The Defendant employed the use of rigid fuel line connections to various compon-
ents along the fuel line system and specifically the reservoir tanks.
e). The Defendant CESSNA failed to provide fuel lines with sufficient slack or curl
in the area of the wing to fuselage root connections such that the lines could ac-
commodate a displacement of the wings such as occurred herein.
COMMENTWinter, 1980]
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In 1973 a California superior court rendered a judgment for the
sum of $432,000 in an aviation crashworthiness issue. In this case, Fuller
v. Capitol Sky Park,59 a crop duster negligently flew his plane into the ground
while dusting crops. His seat belt failed, and he was thrust out of the
plane resulting in permanent paraplegia. The defective seat belt was not
the cause in fact of the accident but was the proximate cause of his in-
juries. The court thus found the manufacturer liable.
One of the most important cases in recent years involving the utiliza-
tion of the doctrine of crashworthiness in aviation is Eichstedt v. Cessna Air-
craft Co.6" Significantly, the plaintiff succeeded on an initial claim that the
design of the aircraft was uncrashworthy. In this case, decedent was a
passenger in a six passenger Cessna airplane which crashed near Galena
Creek Canyon, Nevada, during an aerial survey of proposed power line
routes between Reno and Lake Tahoe. During this survey the plane un-
expectedly lost power and crashed on the north wall of the canyon. Mr.
Eichstedt survived the initial impact and climbed from the plane under his
own power. He later succumbed to internal injuries received from the
crash. Plaintiffs alleged improper installation of the seat belts used by
decedent, absence of shoulder harnesses, and the seat upon which
decedent was sitting left its track upon impact. All three alleged defects pre-
sented crashworthiness issues and were pursued under theories of negligence,
warranty, and strict liability. The jury responded to plaintiff's claims by finding
the manufacturer liable and awarding plaintiffs the sum of $900,000. The
case seems to be at this point a milestone in aviation crashworthiness
litigation.
July of 1978 produced a favorable result for the plaintiff in McGee
v. Cessna Aircraft Co.61 Helen McGee sought damages from Cessna for
injuries sustained in the crash of a 1968 Model 177 Cardinal Cessna.
Plaintiff charged negligence in the design of the aircraft and design de-
fects in the fuel system which made the plane inherently unsafe. Expert
testimony showed that there was an accumulator fuel tank located on the
passenger side of the firewall separating the passengers from the engine.
It rested at the feet of pilot and co-pilot and was part of the floor of the
cockpit. The Cessna aircraft also had a nonretractable nosewheel attached
to the aircraft by a metal strut. This strut was connected relatively close
f). The Defendant CESSNA routed fuel lines in the vicinity of ignition sources when it
was not necessary to do so.
g). The Defendant CESSNA failed to minimize hazards of a crash such as occurred
herein by centralizing and protecting fuel lines but instead the Defendant spread the
fuel system in such a way that it existed over, above and on all sides of the occu-
pants of the aircraft and literally surrounded them with a potentially dangerous
hazard.
59 No. 20364 (Super. Ct., Sacramento Div. Feb. 1973).60 No. 282 029 (Washoe Cy. Dist. Ct. Nev. Aug. 1977).
6182 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978).
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to the accumulator tank. In the actual accident in which the plaintiff was
involved, the strut ruptured the accumulator tank and fire erupted. Of the
four occupants of the plane, only the front two were rendered uncon-
scious. The rear seat passengers evacuated the plane and proceeded to
pull the other two occupants out. Helen McGee was removed last. She
suffered extensive third degree bums over both of her legs which eventually
led to the amputation of both legs. The trial court entered judgment on
a verdict in favor of the manufacturer. Plaintiff appealed. On appeal,
Cessna contended that the crashworthiness concept should not be applied
to aviation cases and that aircraft safety design requirements are matters
to be left to legislative determination. The court of appeals rejected this
contention and held that the plaintiff was entitled to have the manufacturer's
responsibility for the airplane's crashworthiness evaluated under the prin-
ciple of liability in tort. However, on remand, the court entered judgment
for defendant Cessna."
IV. STANDARDS FOR DESIGN OF CRASHWORTHY AIRCRAFT
There are several sources of standards for crashworthy design in the
field of aviation. One such source is the Federal Aviation Administration.
The Federal Aviation Administration has been granted the power by Con-
gress to set up minimum standards governing design of civil aircraft. "
However, the standards relating to crashworthy design have fallen far
short of adequacy. For example, section 23.561 (b) of Volume 14 of the
Code of Federal Regulations64 states that "the structure must be designed
to give each occupant every reasonable chance of escaping serious injury
in a minor crash landing." This standard is so extremely vague that it
leaves the manufacturer with little guidance for sufficient crashworthy
design. As for seat belt specifications, section 23.1413 of Volume 14 of
the Code of Federal Regulations65 states that the strength of seat belts
and harnesses may not be less than the ultimate load specified in section
23.561. Section 23.561 sets the forward inertia force to which a belt or
harness should be able to withstand at nine g's of pressure. It has been
shown in research tests that the average human can tolerate forty g's of
forward deceleration. 6 The government standard is obviously insufficient.
Another source of design standards for crashworthiness is the Society
of Automotive Engineers, Inc. which publishes recommended standards
for aircraft design. 7 These standards do cover some of the features which
are considered crashworthiness features. These are merely recommendations
62 Cal. Super. Ct. for County of San Diego, April 4, 1980.
6349 U.S.C. § 1421 (1970).
"14 C.F.R. § 23.561 (1969).
65 14 C.F.R. § 23.1413 (1978).
86 R. SNYDER, BIOENGINEERING OF IMPACT SURVIVAL IN BUSINESS AIRCRAFT, 1289 (Society
of Automotive Engineers, Inc. Technical Paper Series No. 690335 (1972).
6r Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc. Aerospace Recommended Practices.
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and not mandatory requirements. The United States Army has published
an intricate crash survival design guide to aid engineers in designing
military aircraft. 8 This information could very well be utilized in designing
sufficiently crashworthy aircraft. But here again, use of this information
is not mandatory.
A final source of standards for crashworthy design features is those
standards of quality which each individual manufacturer may place upon
itself. The manufacturer desires to design aircraft which will be relatively
safe. However, the manufacturer has other interests to consider as well.
The manufacturer wishes to design an aircraft which will be quick, at-
tractive, and energy efficient. He must also keep costs down for both the
consumer and himself. These factors many times conflict with the need
for crashworthy design. Therefore, the forces of the free market are in-
sufficient to set crashworthy design standards. Some may argue that if
the consumer does not demand an aircraft with such design features, then
such should not be forced upon him. But where does this leave the inno-
cent bystander who is merely an occupant on such aircraft?
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of crashworthiness will in all probability become very much
an accepted concept in the field of aviation litigation. The doctrine has been
so well accepted in land travel that it seems doubtful that it will be re-jected in air travel. Because of the similarities between the two modes of
transportation and the ability to design both automobiles and planes with
significant crashworthy features, it is unlikely that the courts will distinguish
between the two.
The probability of the doctrine's acceptance in aviation litigation is
enhanced by the social need for its acceptance. The possibility of liability
on the part of the manufacturer may aid in causing the manufacturer to
strive for much needed crashworthy design features. At present there
is little stimulus to provoke such new design other than the forces of the
free market.
In cases such as Smith v. Cessna, Eichstedt v. Cessna, and McGee v.
Cessna we have witnessed the birth of the doctrine in the field of aviation.
We have seen the same principles which have proven so successful in
automobile accident litigation applied for the first time to airplane crashes.
As the doctrine is utilized more in the field of aviation, the safety con-
scious consumer can only hope that the doctrine will lead to the ultimate
goal, the design and manufacture of a sufficiently crashworthy aircraft.
ROBERT KENT
e8 CRASH SuRwivA DESIGN GumE, (USAAMRDL Technical Report 71-22, U.S. AjiMy 1971).
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